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THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICIALS
TO THEIR OUTSIDE AUDITOR FOR
FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD
Michael R. Young*
INTRODUCTION
To some, the prospect of an auditor being able to sue a corporate
official because of misstated financial statements may seem exactly
backward. Many would argue that it is fundamentally the responsibil-
ity of the auditor to see that financial statements are fairly presented.
After all, only the independent CPA generally may issue an audit re-
port.' If the subject of that report turns out to be false, corporate
officials might assert, is it not the auditor who should be liable to
them?
Not necessarily. Less than four years ago, an informal survey of
lawyers by The Wall Street Journal could uncover only a single re-
ported case in which an auditor had filed claims against its client com-
pany or management.2 Today, in addition to dealing with shareholder
litigation prosecuted by a seeming cottage industry of class action law-
yers, corporate officials have to worry about claims based on false fi-
nancial statements from what many would consider a wholly unlikely
source: the CPAs who audited them.
Relatively little has been written about this aspect of shareholder
litigation, for the overwhelming emphasis has been upon the outside
auditor as defendant. Throughout the past decade, though, perceived
responsibility for fraudulent financial reporting-even as to audited
financial statements-has increasingly shifted from the auditor to the
company and its management. This shift has resulted in the increasing
viability of independent claims by auditors against the officers and di-
rectors of their client companies.
* Partner, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, New York, New York. J.D., Duke Univer-
sity School of Law, 1981; B.A., Allegheny College, 1978. Peter M. Brown assisted in
the preparation of this study.
1. See, eg., N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 7401-7402 (McKinney 1985) (providing that only
certified public accountants or other similarly licensed practitioners may sign an audit
report). See generally Unif. Accountancy Act § 14(a) (2d ed. 1994) ("No person or
firm not holding a valid certificate ... shall issue a report on financial statements
2. See Gabriella Stem, Coopers & Lybrand Brings Countersuit Against Phar-Mor
Over Firm's Problems, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1992, at A3 ("Attorneys who represent
accounting firms recall only one other lawsuit filed as a counterclaim against a client
company and its management in the early 1980s. BDO Seidman, the 10th.biggest
U.S. accounting firm then known as Seidman & Seidman, sued management of Cenco
Corp., a Chicago medical supplies firm, for fraudulently leading Seidman to issue a
clean opinion on Cenco."). Actually, the lawyers surveyed by The Wall Street Journal
missed a couple. See infra note 73.
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This development is significant for at least two reasons. One is that
the auditor may recover from corporate officials substantial damages
in shareholder litigation, even damages the auditor itself paid to settle
shareholder claims. The other is that the mere existence of auditor
claims can preclude corporate officials from settling a class action on
their own, because the corporate officials, even after consummation of
the settlement, may still be vulnerable to litigation from the outside
auditor. In the frequently-encountered situation in which an auditor,
performing the traditional role of deep pocket, declines to settle, the
auditor can virtually preclude a settlement by anyone, no matter how
much money corporate officials are willing to pay.
This study looks at the changing perceptions as to financial state-
ments and, in particular, at the developments over the last decade that
have made corporate officials-and "officials" is meant to include
both officers and directors-particularly vulnerable to outside auditor
claims. It then addresses the potential bases for auditor claims, how
claims by auditors are being treated by the courts, and the implica-
tions of such claims, particularly as to class action settlements.
I. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS AS TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
A. Pre- Treadway
In a sense, corporate officers and directors have always been theo-
retically vulnerable to auditor claims should their financial statements
turn out to be false. It is an explicit component of the auditor-client
relationship that the financial statements are the responsibility of the
company's management.' At the heart of audit testing pursuant to
generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS") has always been
management-generated data.4 Where that data is false, it is fairly
straightforward to find the elements of a claim for intentional or negli-
gent misrepresentation and to conclude, as a matter of law, that a
claim by the auditor exists.
Still, auditor litigation against a company and its management never
really seemed to get off the ground. Perhaps part of the reason in-
volved a tactical decision by the outside auditor caught up in share-
holder litigation that the filing of cross-claims or third-party claims
against corporate officials would only operate to throw gasoline on the
litigation fire. In part, an auditor's reluctance to make such claims
may have resulted from a sense that auditor litigation seeking to place
blame on others ran against the grain of unsophisticated, albeit con-
ventional, wisdom, which incorrectly held the auditor accountable for
practically everything the financial statements said. In part there was
probably a recognition that claims against company management
would result in claims by management against the auditor, and that in
3. See AICPA Professional Standards AU § 110.02 (1995).
4. See id. AU §§ 326.14 to .18.
2156 [Vol. 64
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICIALS
such a battle the auditor might well come up with the short end of the
stick.
Whatever the explanation, the last several years have witnessed de-
velopments that are changing the dynamic. Officers and directors are
coming to be viewed as having increased responsibility for their com-
pany's financial statements, and auditors are correspondingly coming
to be viewed as having less. At the same time, the law and the trail of
available evidence increasingly point to the financial reporting culpa-
bility of corporate officers and directors where the financial state-
ments turn out to be false. The tactical balance has changed.
B. The Treadway Commission
One of the biggest catalysts for change has been the Report of the
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, commonly
known as the report of the Treadway Commission.5 Named after its
chairman, former Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
member James Treadway, and sponsored as a private-sector initiative
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA"), the American Accounting Association, the Financial Ex-
ecutives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National
Association of Accountants, the Treadway Commission during a two-
year period studied the financial reporting system in the United States
with the goal of identifying the causes of fraudulent financial report-
ing and what can be done to stop it.6
In the contest for first place among those responsible for the pre-
vention of financial fraud, the Treadway Commission picked the com-
pany and its management. The Commission's report opens with the
proposition that "[t]he company and its management are the key play-
ers in the financial reporting system" and that "they bear the primary
responsibility for the preparation and content of the financial state-
ments."7 In particular, the Treadway Commission emphasizes "the
tone at the top"-the corporate environment or culture within which
financial reporting occurs-as "the most important factor contributing
to the integrity of the financial reporting process." s It is largely upon
the shoulders of the board of directors and senior corporate officers,
accordingly, that the Treadway Commission places most of the re-
sponsibility for ensuring the integrity of financial statements.9 The
5. National Comm'n on Fraudulent Fin. Reporting, Report of the National Com-
mission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987) [hereinafter Report of the National
Commission].
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 17.
8. Id at 32.
9. Id. at 31-33. Among the specific recommendations of the Commission are that
corporate officials establish an "appropriate tone" and "overall control environment"
that foster the integrity of the financial reporting process. Id. at 31. Other recommen-
dations include the design and implementation of a strong internal control system, id.
1996] 2157
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outside auditor in all this does not get off scot-free. While acknowl-
edging that the financial statements are "first and foremost the re-
sponsibility of the management of the reporting entity," the
Commission makes clear that "the independent public accountant
plays a crucial role" and sets forth specific recommendations to en-
hance the auditor's effectiveness.' ° Still, ultimate responsibility is
placed squarely upon corporate officials.
The report of the Treadway Commission proved to be something of
a watershed. The financial community almost instantaneously came
to view its recommendations as authoritative." Legal writers dis-
cussed at length the Treadway report and advocated a level of dili-
gence consistent with its recommendations.'" Of particular
significance here, the national accounting firms separately took steps
to apprise the directors and officers of their client companies as to
precisely what was now expected of them according to the report's
recommendations. Thus, the accounting firms published their own
monographs, duly distributed to corporate officials, which highlighted
the recommendations of the Treadway report and outlined their view
as to what corporate officials, and audit committees in particular,
should be doing.13 Management letters, typically issued at the conclu-
sion of an audit engagement, explicitly or implicitly began to assume
at 33-34; implementation of an effective internal audit function, id. at 37-39; and the
establishment, and vigilant oversight, of an active audit committee of the board of
directors. Id. at 39-44.
10. Id. at 49, 50-52.
11. For example, one report comments, "The Treadway Commission has been
hailed by members of Congress, the SEC and others as making a significant contribu-
tion to the challenge of reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting." Leo-
nard P. Novello, Audit Committee Comes of Age, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 14, 1989, at 5, 6; see
also Dingell Plans to Propose Bill to Implement NCFFR Recommendations, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1809 (Nov. 27, 1987) (introducing new legislation
based on the recommendations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting); Robert K. Herdman & Robert D. Neary, Before Congress: The SEC Re-
sponds to Treadway, Fin. Executive. Sept./Oct. 1988, at 15 (discussing proposed legis-
lation based on the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
recommendations that would affect corporate governance, reporting, and
enforcement).
12. See, e.g., Daniel J. McCauley, Jr. & John C. Burton, Audit Committees A-1
(BNA Corp. Practice Series No. 49, 1992) (noting the expanded role of audit commit-
tees and discussing their practical benefits); Committee on Law & Accounting, "Man-
agement" Reports on Internal Contro- A Legal Perspective, 49 Bus. Law. 889, 899
(1994) (advocating the use of materials prepared in response to the recommendations
of the Treadway Commission by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations); Fraud
Panel May Urge SEC to Mandate Audit Committees for Public Companies, AICPA
Told, 1986 Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA) No. 205, at A-8 (Oct. 23, 1986) (discuss-
ing the Treadway Commission's recommendations); Leonard P. Novello, Internal
Control: Reliability in Financial Reporting, N.Y. L.J., June 28, 1990, at 5 (assessing the
advantages and disadvantages of the SEC's Report of Management's Responsibilities
which includes principles stemming from the Treadway report).
13. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, Guide to Forming and Running an Effective Audit
Committee (1989); Coopers & Lybrand, Audit Committee Guide; Deloitte & Touche,
Current Issues for Audit Committees 1992; Ernst & Young, Audit Committees: Func-
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the Treadway recommendations as important criteria against which
the corporate-governance aspects of internal control systems were to
be measured.
While the Treadway report started out as just a private-sector initia-
tive, it has now come very close to establishing a generally accepted
standard against which corporate behavior may be measured. Insofar
as the report or its contents were communicated to individual direc-
tors, audit committee members, or others, it may by this point even
have become admissible evidence, available to juries in shareholder
litigation as a litmus test for assessing culpability.
C. Other Developments
The increasing significance of the Treadway report did not. how-
ever, occur in isolation. It was accompanied by a separate initiative,
undertaken by the AICPA, to close the so-called "expectations
gap"-the gap between what was feared to be the public's perception
of the auditor's role and the auditor's role in fact. 4 The impetus be-
hind this initiative was a concern, rooted in the experience of individ-
ual firms in audit malpractice litigation, that the public assumed a
much greater level of responsibility on the part of the outside auditor
than the outside auditor under professional standards was prepared to
fulfl 15
Here, too, one of the more significant developments was a clearer
allocation of responsibility for financial reporting between corporate
officials and the outside auditor. 6 One visible result was a revision of
the standard form of auditor's report, which now stated explicitly on
the face of the report what had earlier been buried in the underlying
literature articulating GAAS: that the "financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management," whereas the auditor's
responsibility is only to "express an opinion on these financial state-
ments based on our audit. '1 7 While the expectations-gap initiative
also involved some assumption by the auditor of increased responsi-
bilities for the detection of fraud,18 it highlighted the primary respon-
sibility as that of corporate management.
tioning in the 1990s (1992); Touche Ross, The Effective Audit Committee: A Key-
stone of Corporate Governance (1988).
14. See Robert S. Kay & D. Gerald Searfoss, Handbook of Accounting & Audit-
ing 45-24 (2d ed. 1989).
15. See id. 45-24 to -25.
16. See American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 58 (1988).
17. AICPA Professional Standards AU § 508.08 (1995); see also id. AU § 110.02;
cf AICPA Professional Standards AU § 509.07 (1987).
18. See American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 53 (1988). Under the new standard, "the auditor should design the
audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities that are
material to the financial statements." Id. at 3; see also AICPA Professional Standards
AU § 327.05 (1987) ("The auditor's search for material errors or irregularities [Le.,
21591996]
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Still another development operated to affect the allocation of re-
sponsibility for financial reporting between corporate officials and the
auditor. That is the much-touted "litigation crisis" and the very real
specter that, if things continued as they were going, every national
accounting firm was going to be driven out of business. 9 Data made
available by the Big Six firms revealed an astonishing $30 billion of
potential liability for those firms alone at the end of 1992, roughly $3.8
million per partner."0 At the same time, headlines advertised not only
extraordinary jury verdicts but extraordinary settlements as well.
Ernst & Young's $400 million settlement with the federal government
appeared in giant headlines on the front page of The New York
Times.21
Something had to change. And newspaper stories about large ver-
dicts and settlements were soon accompanied by newspaper stories
about accounting firms firing their clients. A March 1, 1993 article in
Business Week is typical. In an article entitled Big Six Firms Are
Firing Clients, Business Week reported: "With growing regularity, ma-jor public accounting firms are turning their backs on many smaller
banks, thrifts, and fledgling companies. Deloitte & Touche, for one,
declined to audit about 60 companies trying to go public last year,
more than half the 103 initial public offerings they actually
evaluated."22 Business Week described the reason as "no mys-
fraud] ordinarily is accomplished by the performance of those auditing procedures
that in his judgment are appropriate in the circumstances to form an opinion on the
financial statements.") (superseded by Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53).
19. In a study prepared by the Big Six firms entitled "A Disproportionate Burden
of Liability," those firms observed:
In recent years, the cost to the public accounting profession of insuring itself
against threatened legal action and the cost of defense and settlements have
created a great threat to the profession's continued existence. At least one
firm, the seventh-largest, has been forced into extinction. Insurance compa-
nies have rapidly and consistently withdrawn from the market of insuring the
profession.
Arthur Andersen & Co. et al., A Disproportionate Burden of Liability 1 (1993) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review); see Accounting Firms Predict Dim Future if Joint
and Several Liability Remains, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 872 (June 18,
1993).
20. Accounting Firms Predict Dim Future if Joint and Several Liability Remains, 25
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 872 (June 18, 1993). In 1992 alone, the Big Six
firms paid out $783 million in awards, settlements, and defeise costs. Id.
21. John H. Cushman, Jr., $400 Million Paid By S.&L. Auditors, Settling U.S. Case,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al, D2; see also Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Black Days for
Accounting Firms, Wall St. J., May 22, 1992, at A10; Rhonda L. Rundle & Lee Berton,
Price Waterhouse Told by Jury to Pay $338 Million in Bank-Auditing Case, Wall St. J.,
May 20, 1992, at A3; Richard B. Schmitt & Lee Berton, Deloitte to Pay $312 Million to
Settle U.S. Claims Related to S&L Failures, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1994, at A6; Amy
Stevens, Ernst & Young and Jones Day Law Firm to Pay $87 Million in Lincoln S&L
Case, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1992, at A3.
22. Kelley Holland & Larry Light, Big Six Firms Are Firing Clients, Bus. Wk.,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 76, 76; see also Marie L. Fiala, CPAs Retreat From Auditing, in Ac-
countants' Liability: 1993, at 25, 27 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
2160 [Vol. 64
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tery."''2 It was because "[i]n recent years, accounting firms have been
forced to fork over hundreds of millions of dollars to settle
lawsuits."'-4
The prospect of accounting firms going out of business or firing cli-
ents turned the conventional wisdom on its head. The conventional
wisdom, typified by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,' had been that the placement of broad re-
sponsibility for financial reporting upon the auditor would operate.
among other things, as a mechanism to diversify risk, since readily-
available insurance would be available to absorb shareholder claims. 6
The analysis was wrongheaded to begin with, and subsequently
proved incorrect.' 7 The accounting firms were in trouble.
All of this culminated in renewed scrutiny as to the auditor's re-
sponsibility and the extent to which the auditor should be at the fore-
front of those held accountable for financial fraud. Courts began to
take notice. In the thick of this reawakening emerged decisions such
as the California Supreme Court's opinion in Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co.,- which scrutinized the role of an auditor and precisely what level
of responsibility an auditor of financial statements was assuming. De-
cisions placing broad responsibilities on auditors such as Rosenblum
came to be undermined or, in the case of Rosenblum itself, reversed
by the legislature. 29
As the dust settled, there thus existed widespread and explicit rec-
ognition of what sophisticated financial analysts had understood all
along: financial reporting was foremost the responsibility of the com-
pany's management, and, in the words of the Treadway report, it is the
company and its management that bear "primary responsibility for the
Series No. 467, 1993); Big Six Retreats From Risky Audits, Pub. Acct. Rep., Dec. 15,
1992, at 1; Firms Flee the Audit, Pub. Acct. Rep., Mar. 15, 1992, at 1; Lee Berton, Big
Accounting Firms Weed Out Risky Clients, Wall St. J., June 26. 1995. at BI; Dean
Faust & Tun Smart, The Big Six Are in Big Trouble, Bus. Wk.. Apr. 6, 1992. at 78.
One Big Six partner was quoted in a 1992 article as saying, "There will be some com-
panies that cannot get an audit at any price." Id.
23. Holland & Light, supra note 22, at 76.
24. Id
25. 461 A.2d 138 (NJ. 1983).
26. Id at 151 ("Independent auditors have apparently been able to obtain liability
insurance covering these risks or otherwise to satisfy their financial obligations. We
have no reason to believe that they may not purchase malpractice insurance policies
that cover their negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who
receive the audit from the company pursuant to a proper business purpose.").
27. An April 1992 issue of Tune magazine, for example, reported, "Increasingly
... insurers are refusing to offer any coverage at all to accounting firms because the
risks are too great and uncertain.... Where 15 firms offered audit insurance about
five years ago, only three or four still do .... Thomas McCarroll, Who's Counting?,
Tune, Apr. 13, 1992, at 48, 50.
28. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
29. See Act of Mar. 17, 1995, 1995 NJ. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 49 (West) (to be codi-
fied at NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-25).
1996] 2161
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preparation and content of the financial statements. ' 30 Accompany-
ing this recognition was the prospect of enhanced receptivity by
courts, juries, and others to the financial reporting responsibilities of
officers and directors. Also accompanying this recognition was more
explicit delineation of management's responsibilities in auditor's re-
ports, management letters, CPA firm monographs, and even the
Treadway Commission report itself, all in a form potentially admissi-
ble into evidence and therefore available to a jury. Fairly well under-
stood were the implications as to litigation against corporate officials
by shareholders. Less well understood, but just as important, were the
implications as to litigation against corporate officials by the outside
auditors themselves.
II. THE BASES FOR LIABILITY
A. The Audit Process and Internal Control
So exactly what can the outside auditor potentially sue officers and
directors for? The answer lies in the basics of the audit process and
the way it can be frustrated through financial fraud.
At bottom, an audit depends largely upon information that is pro-
vided by the company whose financial statements are being audited. 3'
The auditor tests that information-through inquiry, observation,
and/or independent confirmation-but at the root of the audit process
is company-provided data.32 The auditor is to maintain a degree of
"professional skepticism" and not to take everything at face value.33
And the auditor, under the more recent standards, is required to un-
dertake some level of testing for the purpose of detecting fraud.34 The
underlying presumption, though, is that the company will generally do
its best to provide the auditor with accurate data.35 The basic function
30. Report of the National Commission. supra note 5, at 17.
31. AICPA Professional Standards AU §§ 326.14 to .18 (1995).
32. See Dan M. Guy et al., Auditing 6 (3d ed. 1993).
33. AICPA Professional Standards AU § 316.16 (1995). The concept of "profes-
sional skepticism" is introduced in the literature as follows:
An audit of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards should be planned and performed with an attitude of pro-
fessional skepticism. The auditor neither assumes that management is dis-
honest nor assumes unquestioned honesty. Rather, the auditor recognizes
that conditions observed and evidential matter obtained, including informa-
tion from prior audits, need to be objectively evaluated to determine
whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement.
Id.
34. Id. AU § 316.05.
35. The concept of "professional skepticism" walks a fine line between a presump-
tion of management's unquestioned honesty, which would make an independent audit
somewhat superfluous, and a presumption of management's dishonesty, which would
make an independent audit somewhat impossible. Hence the concept that the auditor
"neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty."
Id. AU § 316.16. A presumption of management dishonesty, the literature cautions,
"would be contrary to the accumulated experience of auditors" and would require the
2162 [Vol. 64
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of an audit under GAAS is to allow the auditor to formulate an opin-
ion as to whether the financial statements present fairly the data with
which the auditor has been presented. It is not to ferret out fraud.'
These underlying audit concepts are significant to the responsibili-
ties of corporate officials, because it is the officers and directors who
bear ultimate responsibility for seeing to it that the information given
to the auditor is accurate. It is their responsibility to see that the in-
ternal control system generates accurate and reliable information. It
is their responsibility to see that the people providing the auditor with
information-information that is both empirically verifiable and less-
verifiable nuances of business conditions and prospects-are com-
pletely honest and candid.37
These are not of course management responsibilities that arise only
in the context of an audit; they are management responsibilities that
are inherent in corporate governance. Management needs to hire
honest people. Management needs to see that corporate personnel
are properly motivated. Management needs to put in place an inter-
nal control system that accurately captures and records the transac-
tions of the enterprise so that they are properly set forth in internal
and external financial data. This is the essence of the "internal control
structure"-the process by which the company records and reports
financial information.38
auditor potentially "to question the genuineness of all records and documents ob-
tained from the client," making the audit "unreasonably costly and impractical." Id.
AU § 316.17. Thus, in the words of one writer, "if the members of the audit team
conclude it is likely management is not acting in good faith, the auditors usually
should resign." Howard Groveman, How Auditors Can Detect Financial Statement
Misstatement, J. Acct., Oct. 1995, at 83, 85.
36. "Generally accepted auditing standards were not designed to uncover the
machinations of a dishonest management." Groveman, supra note 35. at 85. The re-
sponsibility of an auditor to detect fraud may soon be clarified further by the promul-
gation of a new Statement on Auditing Standards entitled "Consideration of Fraud in
a Financial Statement Audit." See Jane Mancino, The Auditing Standards Board Re-
considers Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, In Our Opinion (Auditing Standards
Div. of the AICPA, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 1996, at 1-2 (clarifying the responsibilities
of auditors and the application of audit procedures directed to the detection of finan-
cial fraud).
37. AICPA Professional Standards AU § 110.02 (1995).
38. Id. AU § 319.06. The professional standards break down a company's internal
control structure into three elements: (1) the control environment; (2) the accounting
system; and (3) control procedures. Id. AU § 319.08. The "control environment"
(which is comparable to the "tone at the top" discussed in the Treadway report) is
defined to include such factors as management's philosophy and operating style, the
entity's organizational structure, the functioning of the board of directors and its audit
committee, methods of assigning authority and responsibility, management's control
methods for monitoring, and personnel policies and practices. Id. AU § 319.09. The
"accounting system" is defined to include "the methods and records established to
identify, assemble, analyze, classify, record, and report an entity's transactions and to
maintain accountability for the related assets and liabilities." Id. AU § 319.10. "Con-
trol procedures" are defined to be "those policies and procedures in addition to the
control environment and accounting system that management has established to pro-
1996] 2163
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B. What Happens in Financial Fraud
What happens in the context of fraud is that somewhere this inter-
nal control structure breaks down. It can happen at a low level-the
mistaken employment of a dishonest low-level employee who embez-
zles company funds. Or it can happen at a much more senior level. A
chief executive officer or chief financial officer may place undue pres-
sure on others to generate earnings increases that make some level of
overly-optimistic record keeping almost inevitable.39
It so happens that the large-scale frauds typically fall into the latter
category. Where isolated dishonesty such as embezzlement is a prob-
lem, the extent of the defalcations tend to be isolated and readily
quantifiable. In large-scale fraud, in contrast, the originators fre-
quently turn out to include the most senior officials. Under pressure
themselves, from shareholders, analysts, creditors, or others, senior
management, with the witting or innocent approval of the directors,
may push their employees to achieve at all costs an unattainable level
of performance. Lower-level employees, fearful for their jobs, bend
over backward to comply. The normal self-correcting mechanisms in-
herent in a company, such as a basic desire of people to do a good job
and to be honest, are overridden by pressures created at higher levels.
It bears emphasis that here we are talking about real fraud-not the
contrived allegations of strike-suit lawyers based on disappointing
earnings. When real fraud occurs, it is often the case that "the com-
pany's top management, such as the CEO, the president, and the
CFO, were the perpetrators."40
The genesis of financial fraud, therefore, is something that must be
addressed at a level senior to the most senior executives in the com-
pany. There is only one such level: the board of directors. And it is
precisely the modern consensus that it is board of director oversight
that plays a critical role in preventing and detecting financial fraud.
The Treadway report thus observes that "primary responsibility" for
financial reporting "lies with top management, overseen by the board
of directors."'"
vide reasonable assurance that specific entity objectives will be achieved." Id. AU
§ 319.11.
39. For a classic illustration, see Mark Maremont, Blind Ambition, Bus. Wk., Oct.
23, 1995, at 78.
40. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 24.
41. Id. at 40; see also Donald J. Kirk & Arthur Siegel, How Directors and Auditors
Can Improve Corporate Governance, J. Acct., Jan. 1996, at 53 ("The panel [appointed
by the Public Oversight Board and the SEC practice section of the AICPA] said the
time was now for the profession to expand existing 'best practices' by shifting its focus
from a compliance and rule-oriented audit to one recognizing the board of directors
as its client and by becoming part of what is called a 'corporate governance' approach
to improved financial reporting."); Public Oversight Bd., Strengthening the Profes-
sionalism of the Independent Auditor 13 (1994) ("[M]ore effective corporate govern-
ance depends vitally on strengthening the role of the board of directors.").
2164 ['Vol. 64
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For a board of directors ostensibly trying to act in good faith, this
can be a terrifying prospect. There are, after all, very real limitations
on what a board of directors can do. Certainly it is too much to expect
an outside director to fly-speck every number a company generates.
And, while directors might be placed on notice when certain numbers
appear out of whack, directors can be deceived just like everyone else.
But what a director can do, and what is quintessentially a board-
level function, is to make every effort to establish "the tone at the
top" and to see to it that firmly embedded in the corporate culture are
basic values of honesty, accuracy, candor, and objectivity. It is also
quintessentially a board-level function to undertake to see that these
values are respected not only as a matter of corporate culture, but that
the mechanical processes through which the company records,
processes, and reports financial information are given adequate sup-
port and resources so that they function in such a way that permits the
generation of accurate data.42 Often the fulfillment of these responsi-
bilities will involve board-level resistance to what is otherwise an
overriding goal: the maximization of reported earnings.
A consequence of all this is that, where financial fraud occurs on a
less-than-isolated scale, blame may, depending on the circumstances,
find its way right to senior management, the board of directors, and
the audit committee. To the extent that corporate officials were
knowingly involved in the fraud, they will be vulnerable to auditor
accusations of intentional misrepresentation.43 To the extent they
share culpability resulting from a failure of diligence or a failure to
42. The importance of these board-level responsibilities explains in large part the
heightened emphasis in the financial community upon the role of the board's audit
committee. The Treadway Commission, for its part. is unequivocal. It states: "The
audit committee of the board of directors plays a role critical to the integrity of the
company's financial reporting." Report of the National Commission, supra note 5. at
12. The Treadway Commission thus mandates that "audit committees should be in-
formed, vigilant, and effective overseers of the financial reporting process and the
company's internal controls." Id. at 41. Indeed, it was the implication for expanded
audit committee responsibility that was probably regarded as the most significant as-
pect of the Treadway report. Certainly it was the most written about. See, e.g.. Mc-
Cauley & Burton, supra note 12, at A-1 (discussing the expansion of audit committees
and their practical benefits); Ivan Bull & Florence Cowan Sharp, Advising Clients on
Treadway Audit Committee Recommendations. J. AccL, Feb. 1989, at 46 (outlining
ways to implement the recommendations of the Treadway Commission); Fraud Com-
mission Recommends Quality Assuranc Audit Committees, 2 Corp. Couns. Weekly
(BNA) No. 39, at 2 (Oct. 7, 1987) (reporting the findings of the Treadway report);
Duane R. Kullberg, A New Stimulus to Fight Fraudulent Financial Reporting: How
the Treadway Commission Has Strengthened the Audit Committee's Role, Directors &
Boards, Fall 1987, at 21, 22 ("No single issue is more central to the Treadway recom-
mendations than the need for a strong audit committee.").
43. See 3A James Solheim & Kenneth Elkins, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations § 1146, at 348 (rev. vol. 1994) ("[F]alse representations as to the
financial condition of the corporation, made by corporate officers, make[ I the officers
participating in, or consenting to, the fraud liable to persons who are injured by reli-
ance on the representations ....").
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fulfill internal control responsibilities, they will be vulnerable to audi-
tor accusations of misrepresentation arising out of negligence. 4 For,
in the wake of the discovery of fraud, the auditor will likely come to
realize that the auditor has been deceived along with everyone else.
III. THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW
A. The Evidence
Now it is time for the litigators. And to the frustration of officers
and directors, they may find to their horror that, to the extent they
have not fulfilled their financial reporting responsibilities, an evidence
trail has already been laid suggesting some degree of senior-level and
board-level liability to the auditor.
Foremost in this evidence trail will be the audit "representation let-
ter." This is the letter signed by senior officials, typically the CEO
and/or the CFO, in which they represent to the auditor that all finan-
cial records and related data have been made available, that material
transactions have been properly recorded, and that there have been
no irregularities involving management or internal control person-
nel.15 Where financial fraud surfaces, one or more of these represen-
tations turn out to be false. The first thing that happens. therefore, is
that these representations, and the basis for them, are immediately
called into question and the signing officials are potentially vulnerable
for misrepresentation to the auditor.
Vulnerability does not, though, stop with the one or two officials
who signed the letter. Typically the entire board of directors, and cer-
tainly the members of the audit committee, will be aware of the repre-
sentation letter and its contents. Indeed, a set of "Good Practice
Guidelines for the Audit Committee" places upon the audit commit-
tee responsibility for personal review of the representation letter and
inquiry into aspects relevant to its representations.46 So now the audit
committee, and for that matter the entire board of directors on whose
behalf the committee was acting, may share some responsibility for
written representations that were demonstrably false. The defense of
truth being unavailable, the directors may be reduced to arguing igno-
rance, diligence, or that their motives were pure.
Their vulnerability can be exacerbated by the newly-revised con-
tents of the audit report itself. As mentioned above, the responsibility
of management for the audited financial statements is no longer im-
plicit in the typical report. Now it is explicitly and prominently set
44. See In re The Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., No. 92 Civ. 8036 (WCC), slip op. at 42
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1996) ("We conclude that [the auditor] has sufficiently alleged con-
duct on the part of the [directors] to support a claim for negligent
misrepresentation.").
45. See AICPA Professional Standards AU § 333A.05 (1995).
46. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 181.
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forth, in the first of three paragraphs, that, "[t]hese financial state-
ments are the responsibility of the Company's management. '4 7 While
corporate officials may argue among themselves over precisely who
constitutes "management," a normal jury may be less willing to en-
gage in such hairsplitting.
An additional trail of evidence leading to the culpability of corpo-
rate officials may result from their prior approval of Forms 10-Q. 10-
K, or other SEC filings, in draft or final form. Such documents may
have been relied upon by the auditor as evidence of the good faith and
well-founded belief of corporate officials as to the integrity of their
content. Where their content turns out to be misstated, the adequacy
of the official's diligence or, even worse, the extent to which the offi-
cial may have known of the misstatement, can get called into question.
If the officer or director knew, or had reason to know, of internal
control issues compromising the integrity of the information disclosed,
they may be liable to the extent the auditor justifiably relied upon it.
The trail of evidence may get worse. Recall that the national ac-
counting firms have for the most part developed their own
monographs, specifying a laundry list of audit committee responsibili-
ties, which as a matter of practice they have handed out to audit cli-
ents. To the extent that corporate officials have not adequately
undertaken to see that these responsibilities have been fulfilled, their
vulnerability increases. If internal control issues have surfaced in the
past, they may have been included in earlier "management letters,"
pursuant to which the auditor in prior audits may have described areas
where the internal control system needed improvement. It is here,
too, a senior management and board-level responsibility to see that
suggestions in the management letters have been satisfactorily ad-
dressed. If the auditor has earlier described internal control structure
"reportable conditions"" or more egregious "material weaknesses."49
they should have been dealt with. If they have not been, and if the
47. AICPA Professional Standards AU § 508.08 (1995).
48. "Reportable conditions" are defined as
matters coming to the auditor's attention that, in his judgment, should be
communicated to the audit committee because they represent significant de-
ficiencies in the design or operation of the internal control structure, which
could adversely affect the organization's ability to record, process, summa-
rize, and report financial data consistent with the assertions of management
in the financial statements.
Id. AU § 325.02. Reportable conditions may involve aspects of the control environ-
ment, the accounting system, or control procedures. Id.
49. A "material weakness" in the internal control structure is defined as
a reportable condition in which the design or operation of one or more of
the internal control structure elements does not reduce to a relatively low
level the risk that errors or irregularities in amounts that would be material
in relation to the financial statements being audited may occur and not be
detected within a timely period by employees in the normal course of per-
forming their assigned functions.
Id- AU § 325.15.
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fraud can be causally connected to them, the officials may have to
explain their inactivity.
In the broadest sense, it is a typical aspect of state law that those
familiar with material representations may to some extent be held ac-
countable for their accuracy.50 Throughout the course of a normal
audit, corporate representatives will have made any number of written
or oral representations to the auditor, duly recorded by the auditor
through notations in the audit workpapers. Here, too, a director of
normal sophistication will know that such representations in the regu-
lar course will have been made. He or she may potentially be held
accountable for their accuracy.
An important aspect of this evidence trail, moreover, is subtle but
exceedingly important. Frequently, the corporate official's first line of
defense to a misrepresentation claim will be a motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) or its state law equivalent, which
requires that fraud be pleaded with particularity. That means that the
allegation" of fraud generally must be accompanied by specificity as to
precisely what was said, when, where, by whom, and how it was fraud-
ulent.51 The strategic importance of this defense is that it can permit
the corporate official to get out of the case at a preliminary stage on a
motion to dismiss, rather than awaiting the rigors of the discovery pro-
cess (in which something bad almost always turns up) and, horror of
horrors, a trial. The evidence trail laid by a representation letter, SEC
filings, and other such documentation may disarm the 9(b) defense.
50. In New York, for example, a claim for negligent misrepresentation exists
where there has been "carelessness in imparting words upon which others were ex-
pected to rely and upon which they did act or failed to act to their damage." and the
false information was "expressed directly, with knowledge or notice that it will be
acted upon, to one to whom the author is bound by some relation of duty, arising out
of contract or otherwise, to act with care." White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319
(N.Y. [977); see Brown v. Stinson, 821 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Rotanelli
v. Madden, 569 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (App. Div. 1991). "The gist of the action is fraudu-
lently producing a false impression upon the mind of the other party; and if this result
is accomplished, it is unimportant whether the means of accomplishing it are words or
acts of the defendant, or his concealment or suppression of material facts not equally
within the knowledge or reach of plaintiff." Noved Realty Corp. v. A.A.P. Co., 293
N.Y.S. 336, 341 (App. Div. 1937); see also In re The Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., No. 92
Civ. 8036 (WCC), slip op. at 41 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1996) ("Under New York law, the
[directors'] mere presence and participation at such meetings [with the auditor] could
constitute sufficient conduct to support a claim for negligent misrepresentation, even
if [the auditor] does not allege that the [directors] made any affirmative statements in
support of any of the information presented to [the auditor] on which it was intended
to rely.. . ."); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 702,
705 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (under New York law, "silence alone may constitute a fraudulent
act"); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., 552 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (conduct may be sufficient to constitute a false representation).
51. See, e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing the requirements of Rule 9(b) motions); Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 606-
08 (2d Cir. 1972) (same). Comparable pleading requirements have been included in
the new Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b)(1)(B), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995).
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for this documentation may provide the requisite particularity. Put-
ting aside guilt or innocence, the officer or director may be in the case
for the long haul.
B. The Law
The prospect to an officer or director may be frightening, but the
underlying legal basis for liability-largely untapped by the audit pro-
fession-has existed for years. A fraud to which every corporate offi-
cial should be particularly sensitive, for example, arose out of the
financial statements of Cenco Incorporated, a distributor of medical
and health care products. The fraud at Cenco ultimately became the
subject of three published opinions, one in the Seventh Circuit and
two in the Northern District of Illinois.s2 They warrant careful
scrutiny.
What took place at Cenco was in many respects a classic fraud. It
involved the corporation's chairman, its president, a number of vice
presidents, other members of top management, and several members
of the board of directors.5 3 The fraud was perpetrated primarily
through the inflation of inventories, which in turn resulted in a higher
stock price, enhancing the company's ability to make acquisitions.54
The outside auditor, Seidman & Seidman, failed to discover it. The
fraud was ultimately uncovered when Cenco hired a new chief finan-
cial officer, who reported suspicions to the SEC. Rule 10b-5 litigation
followed in which shareholders sued the company, management, and
Seidman & Seidman; Cenco (now under new management) sued Seid-
man & Seidman; and Seidman & Seidman sued Cenco.5 s
At one point the melee spilled into the Seventh Circuit. The result
was a decision by Judge Posner on what has become known as the
"Cenco" or "imputation" doctrine-that a wrongdoing corporation
whose senior management has engineered a fraud may not assert jus-
tifiable reliance on an otherwise-innocent outside auditor who failed
to discover and expose it.56 The holding was significant in precluding
a wrongdoing corporation from suing its auditor (or other profession-
als), and most courts, litigants, and scholars have focused on that as-
pect of the opinion and left it at that.' What has gone largely
52. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982); Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc., 642 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. I. 1986);
Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc., 601 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
53. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 451.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 454-56.
57. See, e.g., O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2053 (1994); FDIC v.
Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216,224 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994);
FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Deloitte &
Touche, 834 F. Supp. 1129, 1139 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Feltman v. Prudential Bache Sec.,
122 B.R. 466, 474 n.9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); Stratton v. Sacks, 99 B.R. 686, 696
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unnoticed is what happened to Seidman & Seidman's claims against
the company.
For what Seidman & Seidman did, as a strategic matter, was to set-
tle with the class of shareholders for $3.5 million, and then to turn its
sights on the company against whom it was making claims for breach
of contract and fraud.58 In making those claims, Seidman & Seidman
presented itself as a victim, setting forth in detail the extent to which it
had been given fraudulent documentation by corrupt officials which,
in turn, had caused it to get caught up in the shareholder litigation
and, ultimately, to pay shareholders the $3.5 million settlement.59 The
company, under the direction of its new management, responded that
an outside auditor possessed no such claim and that Seidman & Seid-
man was in substance making a disguised claim for "indemnity,"
which as a matter of law was unavailable in a 10b-5 case.60 It was an
argument that in subsequent years would appear again, and which is
the subject of controversy to this day.
In Cenco, the Seventh Circuit held for Seidman & Seidman. In a
part of the opinion that has been largely ignored by courts and liti-
gants, the Seventh Circuit held that Seidman & Seidman could state a
claim, separate from a claim for indemnity, for the company's fraud
against Seidman & Seidman. The court explained:
[I]ndemnity is a remedy of one wrongdoer against another: and
Seidman's claim is that it was a victim rather than a wrongdoer. It is
(Bankr. D. Md. 1989); In re Wedtech Corp., 81 B.R. 240, 241-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987); Seidman & Seidman v. Gee, 625 So. 2d. 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Denzil
Y. Causey, Jr. & Sandra A. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants 199-
200 (5th ed. 1995); Matthew G. Dord, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Pro-
fessional Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 127, 137-43; Marian P. Rosner & Jeffrey H. Squire, The Cenco
Defense, in Accountants' Liability: 1988, at 383 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 611, 1988); Michael L. Rugen, The Cenco or Imputation De-
fense: Defeating the "Stop Me Before I Kill Again" Claim, in Accountants' Liability:
1995, at 245 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 526, 1995).
Not everyone agreed with Judge Posner's decision. See, e.g., Cathy A. Gay, Note,
Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman: A Futile Attempt to Deter Management Fraud,
1984 Duke L.J. 141.
58. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 457-58.
60. Id.; see also Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (holding that there cannot be a claim for
indemnification when the party seeking indemnification has committed reckless or
willful criminal misconduct). Architects of class action settlements will appreciate the
significance of an omission made during the Cenco settlement drafting process that
resulted in the dispute. Pursuant to the settlement stipulation with the shareholders,
Seidman & Seidman had been barred from asserting claims for "contribution" or "in-
demnification," but not from asserting other claims. Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco
Inc., 601 F. Supp. 336, 338-39, 341 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Whether this was a conscious
decision by the shareholders, or merely the result of a failure to recognize that in-
dependent claims might exist, is unclear from the record. In any event, no such claim
having been barred, any independent claims would be permitted to proceed if they
did exist as a matter of law (which the court held that they did).
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true that it paid several millions to the class plaintiffs, but it never
admitted wrongdoing or was adjudicated a wrongdoer. Therefore.
if it can prove that Cenco defrauded it into issuing false audit re-
ports which in turn exposed it to liability to the class plaintiffs, the
amount it paid to settle with the class would be a permissible item of
damages.6
The result of Cenco, therefore, was that the company possessed no
claim against the auditor. But the auditor did possess a claim against
the company.
This struck Cenco's new management as absurd, and it thereafter
went back to the district court to try to convince it that the Seventh
Circuit could not have meant what it said.62 In the district court,
Cenco moved for summary judgment as to Seidman & Seidman's
claims, based on the proposition that Seidman & Seidman could not
prove that the corporation had defrauded it and, moreover, that any
such fraud had not been the proximate cause of Seidman & Seidman's
"voluntary" $3.5 million settlement.63 The district court, after re-
minding Cenco that it "undoubtedly must follow the holding of the
Seventh Circuit and its enunciations of law," held that an outside au-
ditor under such circumstances could in fact have a claim.' The court
admonished that the real issue was "not whether Seidman voluntarily
settled," but whether the company's fraud "was a cause of Seidman's
potential liability to the class."65 If that were the case, then "Seid-
man's settlement payment follows from that exposure and can be re-
coverable both under the opinion of the Court of Appeals above and
Illinois law." 66 The auditor still had a claim, and the company still did
not.
Management's frustration only increased. Management thus mus-
tered the courage to return to the district court again, on a renewed
motion for summary judgment, now to persuade the district court that
both the Seventh Circuit and the district court had gotten it all
wrong.67 This time, the district court made clear that its patience was
at an end. After chastising the corporation insofar as "[i]t wastes eve-
rybody's time and the clients' money to bring a summary judgment
motion twice,"' the district court spelled out in detail precisely why
Seidman & Seidman's claim was not a disguised claim for indemnity,
but a separate claim that the auditor itself possessed. The court
stated:
61. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 457-58.
62. Cenco, 601 F. Supp. at 337.
63. Id. at 337-38, 341-42.
64. Id. at 341-42.
65. I& at 342.
66. Id.
67. Seidman & Seidman v. Cenco Inc., 642 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
68. Id at 540.
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Contrary to Cenco's repeated arguments, there is a plain and com-
mon legal distinction between recovery via indemnification and via
damages for a tort.... In the law, "recovery under principles of
contribution or indemnity" is, quite simply, a different animal from
"recovery under principles of direct tort liability." Waiver of the
first is not necessarily waiver of the second. Indemnity generally,
though not always, arises between two tortfeasors, and usually exists
if a contractual or other relationship between the two warrants
shifting one tortfeasor's entire liability to another tortfeasor....
The gist of Seidman's fraud claim is not that it is more equitable
that Cenco pay for Seidman's loss to the class, but that Cenco has
committed a tort on Seidman, and must pay damages for this, dam-
ages which happen to encompass the settlement payment. That this
element of damage overlaps what Seidman maybe could have recov-
ered through indemnity does not make it indemnity.69
As frustrating for officers and directors as the result may seem,
there is much to be said for the analysis of the Seventh Circuit and
district court in the Cenco trilogy. Insofar as the company had fed the
auditor forged documents and false information upon which the audi-
tor relied to its harm, the elements of a claim for misrepresentation
appear to have been satisfied. Also apparently satisfied were the ele-
ments of a claim for breach of contract, insofar as the company was
contractually obligated, pursuant to the terms of the audit engage-
ment, to be honest with its auditor. These claims, moreover, were dis-
tinguishable from a claim for indemnification or, for that matter,
contribution. Indemnification and contribution claims arise out of the
breach of a duty separately owed by two wrongdoers to a common
victim and an attempt by one wrongdoer to shift responsibility to the
other.7" An auditor's claim for misrepresentation or breach of con-
tract, in contrast, arises out of the company's duty to the auditor to be
honest. On a corporate-governance level, the Cenco trilogy implicitly
accepts the fact, not to be explicitly set forth in the Treadway report
until the next year, that determinedly corrupt management may with
effort be able to defraud the outside auditor so that, if fraud is to be
prevented at the outset, that prevention must take place within the
corporation itself. It is the corporate governance version of "an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure."
In the Cenco litigation, management ultimately surrendered. The
case was dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction,71 after
which Seidman & Seidman filed claims for fraud and breach of con-
69. Id. at 541-42 (footnote omitted).
70. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 50-51 (5th ed.
1984); see, e.g., Jordan v. Madison Leasing Co., 596 F. Supp. 707, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (discussing New York's rules for indemnification and contribution and distin-
guishing between the two); see also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 1 (1995); 18 Am. Jur.
2d Contribution § 1 (1985).
71. Cenco, 642 F. Supp. at 543.
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tract in state court. As Seidman & Seidman pressed the case to trial,
management agreed to settle. The case ended with Cenco's successor
paying Seidman & Seidman a confidential sum.
The implications for class action litigation are significant. Not only
may the officers and directors find themselves liable to shareholders.
They may find themselves separately liable to their own auditor. The
damages may include whatever expenditures the auditor may proxi-
mately attribute to its reliance upon the misrepresentations made.
Such damages may potentially include harm to the auditor's reputa-
tion for being mixed up in the litigation to begin with: damages result-
ing from the distraction of professional personnel; costs associated
with the litigation; attorneys' fees; even, as in Cenco. the amount of
money paid to settle the shareholder claims.72 In the context of share-
holder claims based on fraud, these damages can be somewhere be-
tween significant and astronomical.
In the years following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cenco, at
least six federal courts have either explicitly or implicitly accepted as-
pects of its analysis.73 Most recently, the United States District Court
72. See Robert D. Ready, The Auditor's Protection Against Liability Based on Cli-
ents' Fraud, 16 Bus. Law. 1039, 1052 (1961) ("Where the auditor suffers a financial
loss or a loss of reputation as a result of suits for a failure to discover defalcations or
irregularities, he is not without a remedy. If the defalcations or irregularities are man-
agement sponsored, he has an action for fraud against the client."); see also Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 87 Civ. 6125(KMW), 1992 WL 309613, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1992) ("[P]laintiff has provided sufficient evidence to prove the
existence of a material fact regarding whether plaintiff was 'severely injured in its
business, property, goodwill and reputation' as a result of defendants' alleged negli-
gent misrepresentations."); Kennedy v. McKesson Co.. 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1333 (N.Y.
1983) (sustaining claim for damaged reputation based on, among other things, failure
to inform plaintiff of important information).
73. See, e.g., In re The Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., No. 92 Civ. 8036 (WCC), slip op.
at 37 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1996) ("BDO does not simply seek indemnification for its
attorneys' fees. BDO has identified other harms that it has suffered due to [the direc-
tors'] alleged negligent misrepresentation in connection with this lawsuit."): Alexan-
der Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 770 F.2d 717.718-19 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Grant, a
public accounting firm, alleges that it was injured as the result of a pervasive scheme
of mail and wire fraud designed by Tiffany to obtain a favorable audit for the fiscal
year 1977 .... Grant has standing to assert its claims."), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1058
(1986); Coopers & Lybrand v. Shapira, No. 92-1938. slip op. at 14-16 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
11, 1993) ("[Coopers & Lybrand] contends that Shapira. in his position as Chief Exec-
utive Officer and Treasurer of Phar-Mor, had a duty to supervise the other defend-
ants, to verify that the statements made by him and others in the comfort letters were
accurate, and to take steps to ensure that the statements were in fact accurate....
[Tihe motion to dismiss ... will be denied at this stage of the proceedings."); In re
Sunrise Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1306, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("This case is similar to In
re Cenco."); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540,554 (D. Colo. 1989)
("[S]uch claims are independently viable pendent claims."); In re Wedtech Corp., 87
B.R. 279, 287 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The Cenco court... understandably drew a
distinction between the indemnity and tort claims."); cf. Cullen v. Riley. 957 F.2d
1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that "although judgment reduction compensates a
nonsettling defendant for his lost rights of indemnity and contribution, it does not
necessarily compensate him for other lost claims").
19961 2173
2174 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
for the Southern District of New York relied upon Cenco to permit
BDO Seidman, LLP to state claims against corporate officers and di-
rectors in connection with the fraud at The Leslie Fay Companies,
Inc.74 Still, the acceptance of a Cenco analysis has not been entirely
without resistance,75 or at least confusion.76 That has particularly
been the situation where the underlying concepts of audit testing and
74. In re The Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., No. 92 Civ. 8036 (WCC), slip op. at 34
(S.D.N.Y Mar. 5, 1996).
75. In Comeau v. Rupp, 762 F. Supp. 1434, 1440 (D. Kan. 1991), a Kansas district
court said it was "thoroughly unpersuaded by the Accountants' attempt to cast their
claims for indemnity as 'independent claims for relief.'" The history of the pleadings
in the case may have contributed to that result. Though the record is not completely
clear, it appears that the auditors in Comeau may have initially pleaded "indemnity"
claims and then, in response to a motion to dismiss, "del[e]ted any reference to 'in-
demnity'" and instead simply characterized their claims "as 'independent claims for
relief.'" Id. at 1438 n.4. The court concluded that the auditor claims were "part and
parcel of their claims for indemnity," apparently based in part on the fact that the
auditors' alleged damages in Comeau were "entirely dependent upon any liability that
may attach to the Accountants for the claims made against them." Id. at 1440.
The claims alleged in Comeau were thus distinguishable from the claims focused
upon by the Seventh Circuit in Cenco, insofar as the Cenco damages were not contin-
gent upon recovery against the auditor; the Cenco damages were separate and as-
sumed no auditor wrongdoing. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman. 686 F.2d 449.
458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) ("It is true that [Seidman & Seidman)
paid several millions to the class plaintiffs, but it never admitted wrongdoing or was
adjudicated a wrongdoer. Therefore, if it can prove that Cenco defrauded it into issu-
ing false audit reports which in turn exposed it to liability to the class plaintiffs, the
amount it paid to settle with the class would be a permissible item of damages."). The
Comeau court cited to Cenco, but perhaps misinterpreted it as dealing with a modi-
fied form of the defense of contributory negligence in malpractice actions against ac-
countants. See Comeau, 762 F. Supp. at 1440 n.6. Somewhat cryptically, the court,
immediately after citing Cenco, said, "The court restricts its discussion in this order to
the cases and the policy considerations relied upon by plaintiffs and expresses no view
at this time as to the merits of this modified approach.'' Id. A fair inference is that the
situation in Comeau, perhaps owing in part to the history of the pleadings, was some-
what confused. See also Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., No. 90 Civ. 0165
(CSH), 1994 WL 722708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1994) (declining to find an auditor
claim because the auditor's "allegations of duties owed to it by these parties are con-
clusory and unsupported by pertinent authority"); Greene v. Emersons Ltd., No. 76
Civ. 2178 (CSH), 1985 WL 1989, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1985) (declining to find an
auditor claim based in part on the "American Rule" against fee shifting); Greene v.
Emersons, Ltd., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,582, at
97,271-72 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1983) ("I am not in a position to determine whether or
not Leventhal is actually in a position to assert provable damages separate and apart
from its potential liability to the plaintiffs."). The latter three decisions are discussed
below.
76. For example, one leading text describes the holding of Cenco as being "that an
accounting firm could seek common-law indemnity from a fraudulent client for $3.5
million paid to settle a dispute with stockholders." Denzil Y. Causey, Jr. & Sandra A.
Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants 203 (5th ed. 1995). The Cenco
court did not, however, hold that the auditor could seek "common-law indemnity"; in
fact, the court held that the auditor could not, Cenco, 686 F.2d at 457
("[I]ndemnification from a co-defendant... is not allowed in a Rule 10b-5 case.").
What the court held was that there was no indemnity claim, but that there was an
independent claim for damages. Id. at 457-58.
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responsibility for internal control systems have not been clearly un-
derstood. The result is illustrated by three unreported decisions span-
ning almost a decade (one of which was picked up by CCH), all by the
same judge, which have at least two things in common. One is that
they do not discuss, or cite, the analysis of the courts in Cenco. The
other is that the analysis in each is horribly confused.
The first, decided about a year after the first Cenco decision, was
Greene v. Emersons, Ltd.,' in which the accounting firm Kenneth
Leventhal & Co. was sued by shareholders based on the allegedly-
misstated financial statements of a food service company. Leventhal
asserted cross-claims against two corporate officials, including claims
for "fraud," "conspiracy to violate legal rights," and "interference
with business relations and inducing breach of contract." 78 The corpo-
rate officials sought to dismiss the claims, characterizing them as im-
proper claims for indemnity. Leventhal responded that it was setting
forth independent claims resulting in "independent damage upon
Leventhal. '79
The case presented the court with a dilemma. On the one hand, the
suggestion that the auditor might have independent claims against
corporate officials plainly struck the court as intuitively wrong. On
the other hand, the court recognized that the technical elements of a
claim just might exist. To resolve the dilemma, the court punted. It
observed that Leventhal had failed to specify the independent dam-
ages that it might have suffered and that the court was therefore "not
in a position to determine whether or not Leventhal is actually in a
position to assert provable damages separate and apart from its poten-
tial liability to the plaintiffs."8' 0 The court deferred decision and or-
dered Leventhal to itemize its damages.8s
That took care of the problem for another year and a half. But in
mid-1985 the court, now faced with a particularized itemization by
Leventhal, had to confront whether Leventhal did in fact possess sep-
arate claims.s2 Unfortunately, the issue was confused by the fact that
Leventhal's articulated damages were limited to "legal and related ex-
penses arising out of this litigation."'  This led the court to agree with
Leventhal that its claims were "not in any respect claims for indem-
nity," but nonetheless then to conclude that "[i]n a larger sense,
Leventhal seeks indemnity by these crossclaims."' This judicial leap
77. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 99,582, at 97,271
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1983).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 97,272.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Greene v. Emersons Ltd., No. 76 Civ. 2178-CSH, 1985 WL 1989, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1985).
83. Id.
84. Id
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from one conclusion to precisely the opposite was then confused fur-
ther by the court's determination that what was really involved was
the issue of fee-shifting, since Leventhal's measure of damages in-
volved expenses arising out of litigation.8 5 This drew the court to then
take up the issue in terms of the "American Rule" against fee-shifting,
which in fact had nothing to do with it,86 pursuant to which each party
must bear its own litigation expenses. The court found that, pursuant
to the "American Rule," no such shifting on an indemnity claim was
to be allowed. 7
85. Id.
86. The American Rule against fee-shifting involves shifting litigation expenses
from the loser to the winner in the litigation between them. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); United States v. 110-118 Riv-
erside Tenants Corp., 5 F.3d 645. 646 (2d Cir. 1993). The issue presented by
Leventhal, in contrast, did not involve the shifting of fees between Leventhal and the
corporate officials based on Leventhal's success or failure on its cross-claims. Rather,
it involved Leventhal's recovery of litigation expenses incurred in defending the sepa-
rate shareholder claims. In other words, the issue presented by Leventhal's claims did
not involve the shifting of fees between the winner and the loser in the pending litiga-
tion, but the auditor's recovery of litigation expenses incurred in a separate litigation
(or as to separate claims) with a different party.
To be fair, it is unclear the extent to which the issue was framed in terms of fee-
shifting by the parties, rather than by the court. And the analysis was complicated by
the fact that the damages sought by Leventhal were limited to "legal and related
expenses"-excluding, for example, the settlement costs that were at issue in Cenco.
Greene, 1985 WL 1989, at "1. All in all, it was an exceedingly complicated case with
plentiful opportunity for confusion.
87. Id. at *2. The court reached this conclusion by determining that the so-called
"tort-of-another" exception to the American Rule against fee-shifting did not apply.
The court's conclusion here too is questionable, insofar as an auditor who gets mixed
up in litigation as a result of management fraud would seem to qualify squarely as one
who, in the words of the Restatement, "through the tort of another has been required
to act in the protection of [its] interests by bringing or defending an action against a
third person." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914(2) (1977). Such a person, accord-
ing to the Restatement, "is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of
time, attorney fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred in the earlier
action." Id.; see Shindler v. Lamb, 211 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (Sup. Ct. 1959) ("If, through
the wrongful act of his present adversary, a person is involved in earlier litigation with
a third person in bringing or defending an action to protect his interests, he is entitled
to recover the reasonable value of attorneys' fees and other expenses thereby suffered
or incurred."), aff'd, 172 N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 1961).
This tort-of-another rule did not apply, the court held, because the pleadings in-
cluded "claims arising out of Leventhal's own alleged wrongdoing" and, according to
the court, "[w]hat controls is the plaintiffs' pleading," rather than the ultimate out-
come of the case. Greene, 1985 WL 1989, at *1-2. This rationale actually makes little
sense. Wrongful involvement as a defendant in litigation will always be premised
upon some allegation of the defendant's wrongdoing, so the court's exception to the
tort-of-another claim would swallow the rule. The result of the court's analysis, more-
over, would be that the assertion of even an unmeritorious claim of wrongdoing could
unilaterally deprive the tort-of-another plaintiff of an otherwise viable claim against
the defrauders. The court's decision was also contrary to the conclusion of the Sev-
enth Circuit in Cenco, in which the court of appeals held that the extent to which
Seidman & Seidman possessed a claim against the company should be determined as
a matter of proof rather than pleading. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d
449, 458 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Therefore, if it can prove that Cenco defrauded it into
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One may sympathize with this court. The issues can be confusing,
made all the more so in this case because the damages were limited to
litigation expenses. What in fact happened is that the court was mix-
ing up three separate claims without realizing that each should have
been dealt with separately. The court started with independent tort
claims by Leventhal; then leapt to the conclusion that Leventhal was
really seeking indemnity; then leapt to the conclusion that the indem-
nity claim really involved the rule against fee-shifting, which then
guided the court down the wrong legal path to a jumbled conclusion.
It is small wonder that the court's intellectual struggle emerges so viv-
idly from the decision.
Alas, the court was still not free of the issue. Nine years later, the
independent claim issue reared its ugly head again, this time regarding
an audit by Ernst & Young in Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding
L.P.8 In Cortec, the court was faced with a "tort-of-another" claim
by Ernst & Young which, the court suggested, turned on the existence
of an independent auditor claim against the tort-of-another defend-
ants. The court took a step closer to the analysis in Cenco, implicitly
acknowledging the possibility of an independent auditor claim. But it
held that Ernst & Young's allegation was not specific enough and
lacked authority: "Ernst & Young's allegations of duties owed to it by
these parties are conclusory and unsupported by pertinent authority."
Here, again, the court neither discussed nor cited any of the Cenco
cases in its decision. Nor did the parties, who were directing their
attention to the tort-of-another claim alleged in the complaint, discuss
or cite Cenco in their briefs.8 9
What largely appears to have guided the court to its conclusion in
this third case was a basic misunderstanding of the auditor-client rela-
tionship. An independent auditor, the court stated. "is retained to
pass competent professional judgment upon the accuracy of corporate
financial statements and to issue such related documents as comfort
letters."9 The court continued:
issuing false audit reports which in turn exposed it to liability to the class plaintiffs, the
amount it paid to settle with the class would be a permissible item of damages.").
88. No. 90 Civ. 0165 (CSH), 1994 WL 722708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1994).
89. Idi at *5. The Eleventh Circuit reached a more understandable outcome,
though under different facts not involving an auditor, in In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig.,
967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992). In that case, an insurance company tried to assert
purportedly "independent" claims against an insurance broker and another. Id. at
491, 495-96. Though labeled as independent state law causes of action for fraud and
negligence, the substance of the allegation was that the insurance company sought
"damages ... to the extent that it is liable to any of the plaintiffs herein." Id. at 496.
The Eleventh Circuit had no difficulty concluding that "'a rose by any other name is
still a rose,'" and held that the purported fraud and negligence claims were" 'nothing
more than claims for contribution or indemnification with a slight change in word-
ing."' Id. at 496 (quoting S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 749 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (D.S.C.
1990)).
90. Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding LP., No. 90 Civ. 0165 (CSH), 1994 WL
722708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1994).
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If an auditor, in the performance of those tasks, acts fraudulently,
recklessly, or negligently, it has breached its own professional du-
ties, and cannot transform those breaches into, or mask them be-
hind, breaches of duties allegedly owed to the auditor by the
keepers of the books the auditor was retained to audit.91
The problem with this rationale is that an auditor who has been
defrauded is not trying to "transform" audit inadequacies into "al-
leged" breaches of duties owed by corporate management. Corporate
management in fact owes a duty, which is an explicit underpinning of
GAAS, not to defraud the auditor. 2 Where that duty to the auditor is
breached, it is entirely possible that the auditor will not detect the
fraud, notwithstanding the auditor's lack of negligence and complete
conformity to GAAS, particularly where the fraud has been directed
against the auditor itself.93 At a minimum, the possibility of an ab-
sence of auditor wrongdoing suggests that the auditor should be per-
mitted to plead a claim, rather than in essence being adjudged a
wrongdoer based solely on the pleadings. Even where the auditor is
negligent, moreover, the court's conclusion presents some rather basic
problems in terms of rudimentary precepts of justice. One is that,
under the court's analysis, in a litigation between a negligent auditor
and a deliberately-defrauding corporate official, the defrauder wins.
One of the most fundamental problems with the Cortec court's
analysis, though, is that it is contrary to the allocation of responsibility
articulated by the Treadway Commission. The Treadway Commission.
recognizing that financial fraud most frequently originates with senior
corporate officials and the inadequacy of internal control systems.
places primary responsibility for the prevention of financial fraud
upon senior management and the board of directors through its audit
91. Id.
92. AICPA Professional Standards AU §§ 110.02, 333A.05 (1995).
93. The Professional Standards provide:
.07 Because of the characteristics of irregularities, particularly those in-
volving forgery and collusion, a properly designed and executed audit may
not detect a material irregularity. For example, generally accepted auditing
standards do not require that an auditor authenticate documents, nor is the
auditor trained to do so. Also, audit procedures that are effective for de-
tecting a misstatement that is unintentional may be ineffective for a misstate-
ment that is intentional and is concealed through collusion between client
personnel and third parties or among management or employees of the
client.
.08 The auditor should exercise (a) due care in planning, performing, and
evaluating the results of audit procedures, and (b) the proper degree of pro-
fessional skepticism to achieve reasonable assurance that material errors or
irregularities will be detected. Since the auditor's opinion on the financial
statements is based on the concept of reasonable assurance, the auditor is
not an insurer and his report does not constitute a guarantee. Therefore, the
subsequent discovery that a material misstatement exists in the financial
statements does not, in and of itself, evidence inadequate planning, perform-
ance, or judgment on the part of the auditor.
hL §§ 316.07 to .08.
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committee. To the extent such corporate officials are relieved of lia-
bility, the incentive to fulfill these internal control responsibilities di-
minishes. Nor does the auditor, whose responsibilities would
correspondingly increase, possess the ability to substitute adequately
for such management failings. While an auditor may in some in-
stances be able to detect forged documents or other false evidential
matter through audit testing, the auditor does not possess the power
or the authority to prevent such improprieties before they occur. As a
matter of corporate governance, that prevention is strictly within the
purview of the senior officers and directors. It is foreseeable that fu-
ture decisions will conclude that the weight of authority, both in terms
of volume and in terms of intellectual justification, resides with the
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Cenco.
IV. SETrLEMENT PROBLEMS
For corporate officials, the existence of auditor claims carries with it
important procedural and strategic considerations beyond the poten-
tial exposure to the auditor for damages. The reason is that, as widely
known, the overwhelming number of shareholder actions are resolved
not through trial, but through settlement. The existence of auditor
claims can make a negotiated settlement difficult.
Ideally, in the context of settlement, the issue of independent audi-
tor claims would not even come up. The preferred settlement is one
in which all parties come to terms, a settlement stipulation is signed,
everyone releases everyone, and the result is global peace. With some
frequency, however, the ideal solution is not reached. It is sometimes
the case that shareholders will be prepared to settle with corporate
officials for a relatively modest sum, with the expectation of seeking
substantially more money from the deep-pocket auditor, who there-
fore declines to settle. Even here, corporate officials may nonetheless
expect to get "global peace," at least for themselves, through the
court's entry of a "settlement bar order" which precludes auditor
cross-claims for contribution and indemnification back against the
corporate officials.
The problem is that such a settlement bar order, upon which the
corporate officials would rely for global peace, may not properly pre-
clude noncontribution or nonindemnification claims. 4 In other
words, independent auditor claims, to the extent they exist, may pro-
ceed against the settling corporate officials unimpeded. The corporate
officials, thinking they have bought global peace by striking a deal
94. See Cullen v. Riley, 957 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[A]lthough judgment
reduction compensates a nonsettling defendant for his lost rights of indemnity and
contribution, it does not necessarily compensate him for other lost claims. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that this overly broad settlement bar might impermissibly affect
Riley's rights and thus cannot stand.").
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with shareholders, can find themselves brought right back into the liti-
gation by the auditor.
This is precisely what happened, for example, in one of the district
court cases following Cenco, involving the failure of a Florida savings
and loan. In In re Sunrise Securities Litigation,95 shareholders and the
FDIC sued, among others, a law firm and the accounting firm
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells.96 The law firm did not have the stomach
for the fight, and entered a settlement stipulation with both the share-
holders and the FDIC. The settling parties, as is standard in such situ-
ations, sought and obtained from the district court a "settlement bar
order," providing for the dismissal with prejudice of all contribution
claims against the law firm and ordering a proportionate reduction in
the damages to be paid by the remaining nonsettling defendants.9 7
The law firm apparently believed that, having paid its money, it had
bought global peace and had completely terminated its involvement in
litigation.
That turned out to be wrong. Once the law firm had settled, it then
found Deloitte pressing forward with independent auditor claims
based on principles of state law tort and contract. 98 The law firm
dashed back to the district court to seek enforcement of the district
court's settlement bar order. In particular, the law firm sought a rul-
ing that Deloitte's state law tort and contract claims (along with cross-
claims by other parties) were "de facto indemnity claims." and that
the law firm was therefore protected from any further litigation by the
earlier-procured settlement bar order.99
It did not get that ruling. Instead, the court found that the in-
dependent claims could continue to be prosecuted against the settling
law firm because they were left unaffected by the bar order. For sup-
port, the court relied upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cenco.
The court stated:
This case is similar to In re Cenco. The damages that the non-
settling defendants seek for their tort and contract claims are simi-
lar, although not identical, to the damages that they seek for their
indemnification claims. Such an overlap does not necessarily trans-
form the claims into claims for implied indemnity. The state law
cross-claims which the Outside Directors and Deloitte have asserted
against [the law firm] are based upon duties that it allegedly owed
to the outside Directors, not duties that they and [the law firm]
owed to the plaintiffs. Specifically, the various non-settling defend-
ants allege that [the law firm] is liable to them for intentional mis-
representation, negligence, breach of contract, and tortious
95. 793 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
96. See id. at 1309-10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1321.
99. Id.
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interference. They claim that they were directly wronged by [the
law firm]' 0 0
The same thing happened in another case involving Deloitte. this
one arising out of shareholder litigation in connection with a com-
puter software company. In Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehra.10' the
shareholders settled with the company and certain directors among
others, but not with Deloitte. The settling shareholders and directors,
again in accordance with the normal practice, signed a settlement stip-
ulation and then went before the district court to obtain a settlement
bar order against, among other things, any state claims by Deloitte.
Here, too, they were unsuccessful. The court held that. to the extent
Deloitte or the other nonsettling defendants sought damages "mea-
sured by... liability for violation of the Securities and Exchange
Acts," those claims could be "extinguished."' 0 2 But, the court cau-
tioned, to the extent such claims were "independently viable pendent
state claims," they were left unaffected by the settlement bar order.
[T]o the extent damages may be claimed beyond those sought for
violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts, such claims are inde-
pendently viable pendent state claims, and while, in my discretion, I
may decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction, I may not "extinguish"
them.'0
3
The settling parties' motion for an order approving the partial settle-
ment plan was denied."°
1O0. Id.
101. 723 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1989).
102. Id. at 554.
103. Id. (citations omitted). At least one case, though involving different circum-
stances, raises the possibility that any attempt to extinguish independent auditor
claims through a settlement bar may be unconstitutional. In County of Los Angeles
v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Ct. App. 1984), a construction company. hired
by a county to build the foundation for a public building. brought an action against
the county and the architect which designed the building, alleging that it had lost
money because the architect's plans were defective. The county cross-chuned against
the architect for breach of contract. The architect then settled with the plaintiff con-
struction company, and sought to use that settlement to bar the county's cross-claims.
A California trial court held that the county's cross-claims were barred. Id. at 445-46.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. The county's claims against the architect,
the Court of Appeal held, were based on a separate duty owed to the county by the
architect as a result of the contractual relationship between them. Claims based on
conduct in connection with a duty owed to the county by the architect, whether based
on contract or even if "viewed as professional negligence, ergo tortious," were left
unaffected. Id. at 447. Moreover, according to the court, this result was mandated by
the California Constitution. The court found that bar of a direct claim for breach of
contract would amount "to a violation of California Constitution Art. I, section 9
prohibiting the impairment of obligations of contracts." Id.
104. Alvarado, 723 F. Supp. at 554. One unreported case deals with independent
claims with an ironic twist. See In re Alert Income Partners Sec. Litig., No. MDL-915,
slip op. (D. Colo. Mar. 17, 1994). In that case, shareholders commenced litigation
against the officers and directors of a series of failed limited partnerships as well as
against the outside auditor. Ironically, though, here it was the auditor that entered a
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V. WHAT TO Do?
What's an officer or director to do? At the risk of stating the obvi-
ous, the best alternative in the first instance is to study the recommen-
dations of the Treadway Commission and to do one's best to live up to
them. Implementing guidance has, subsequent to publication of the
Treadway report, been published by the so-called Committee of Spon-
soring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 10 5 known as
COSO, which analyzed at length the internal control structure of com-
panies and proposed specific steps to ensure internal control structure
integrity.
Foremost on the list of any official's tasks will be the retention of
honest management and the installation of a "tone at the top" in the
corporate culture that strives to the utmost for honest financial report-
ing and complete integrity and objectivity in the financial reporting
process. Complementing an appropriate "tone at the top," corporate
officials will want an "informed, vigilant, and effective" audit commit-
tee whose members actively oversee the financial reporting process
and the company's internal controls. 106 Below the senior-executive
level, corporate officials will want to ensure that their internal ac-
counting systems, as a matter of corporate personnel, logistics, and
desire, are systematically capable of adhering to financial reporting
goals. A policing mechanism can be implemented through the insis-
tence upon open channels of communication and the development of
an independent and zealous internal audit department, which has the
authority to police and investigate the financial reporting systems and
to report with candor directly to the board of directors or its audit
committee. 10 7 Probably ninety-nine percent of the boards of directors
settlement and one of the officials who declined to. The court held that any in-
dependent claims by the official were not barred. The court stated:
If the damages are measured by the non-settling defendant's liability to
plaintiff on claims that the plaintiff has already settled with other defendants,
then the cause of action is actually a contribution claim and is barred. If, on
the other hand, the damages are measured differently, the cause of action is
not barred.
l at 2. On the record at issue, the court stated that it was "unclear" whether the
claims at issue were "independent claims or disguised requests for indemnification
and contribution." Id. at 3.
105. See Committee of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm'n, Internal Con-
trol-Integrated Framework (1992).
106. Report of the National Commission, supra note 5, at 41.
107. In one form or another, many of these concepts can be found in a number of
popular management texts that have appeared over the last several years. One espe-
cially well received book that, consciously or not, explicates the internal control con-
cepts underlying the Treadway report, and in particular the dangers posed by a
misalignment of measurements and rewards, has been written by the Director of the
W. Edwards Deming Center for Quality Management at the Columbia Business
School. See John 0. Whitney, The Trust Factor. Liberating Profits & Restoring Cor-
porate Vitality (1994).
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in America would insist that they have already attained such goals.
The true percentage is probably significantly less.
None of this is to suggest, of course, that a corporate officer or di-
rector will necessarily be liable to the auditor solely because a finan-
cial fraud has occurred. Liability turns not on the mere existence of
misstated financial statements, but on participation in the misstate-
ment or on a demonstrable failure on the part of corporate officials to
exercise an appropriate level of diligence in the fulfillment of their
financial reporting responsibilities. The required level of diligence
will necessarily vary with the corporate official's role in the orgamza-
tion-whether it be, for example, as an officer, a member of the audit
committee, or a purely outside director. Where corporate officials
have fulfilled their responsibilities, liability should not and will not fol-
low. And if the outside auditor in such an instance has failed to fulfill
its professional responsibilities, then the outside auditor may very well
be liable for the harm thereby caused.les
If fraud does occur and shareholder litigation against officers and
directors results, a critical consideration is the difficulty of a resolution
that does not involve the auditor. It is useful, therefore, to keep the
class action settlement contingent upon the absence of all auditor
claims, so that the officer or director does not find him- or herself in
the unfortunate position of being required to finance the settlement
while still being exposed to further litigation and damages.
108. It is not unusual for an officer or director under such circumstances to consider
an allegation that, like the shareholders, he or she was also relying upon the audited
financial statements, though, in the absence of a demonstrable factual predicate, ex-
perienced trial lawyers may counsel against it. The problem with such an allegation is
that, even where it can be pleaded, it can be surprisingly difficult to prove, given the
access of corporate officials to more frequent and direct financial data than financial
statements that do not appear until months into the following year.
A case in the Supreme Court of the State of New York illustrates the difficulty.
Effron v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., N.Y. LJ., Apr. 20, 1994, at 21-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 19, 1994). The case included claims by officers and directors that they had been
damaged by their reliance on financial statements audited by a Big Six firm. At trial.
the breadth of the jury was illustrated by two jurors who, for purpose of consideration
of such a claim, seemed complete opposites-a commercial banker whose day-to-day
activities involved financial analysis, and an unemployed former laundromat worker.
By the close of plaintiffs' case, these two very different jurors had at least one thing in
common: neither accepted the testimony of the corporate officers and directors that
they had relied upon the financial statements. Both pointed to the officials' access to
much more direct and current information, and called upon their own life experiences
in rejecting the reliance allegation. The banker, subsequent to trial, spoke of the need
of corporate officials to be much more attentive to financial performance than would
be permitted by the annual review of financial statements. The unemployed laundro-
mat worker called to mind her experience in collecting the coins out of laundromat
washing machines as illustrative of her view that you have to pay close attention to a
business, rather than relying upon once-a-year statements of performance. Cf. Fry-
mire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F3d 183, 191 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing that
the plaintiff director "may have considerable difficulty persuading a jury that hears all
of the evidence... that she reasonably relied on Peat Marwick's certification of the
1983 financial statement").
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CONCLUSION
The prospect of corporate officials being liable to their outside audi-
tor does not suggest that, in every financial fraud case, corporate offi-
cials and the auditor need be at each other's throats. In many or most
cases, strategic considerations will yield the conclusion that both are
better off presenting a united front against the class action lawyers
rather than dividing their forces and seeking to make out fraud claims
against each other. Still, it is obviously useful for officers and direc-
tors to understand fully their financial statement responsibilities and
vulnerability. And if a by-product of that is the improvement of the
systems of corporate governance, all the better.
